The russian air force is drawing a sharper warning from air combat specialists than it did at the start of the war in Ukraine. The reason is not simple battlefield momentum. It is a combination of hard-earned combat experience, continued upgrades, and production that has helped Russia rebuild parts of its fleet even after significant losses. That shift matters because the force NATO once judged through older assumptions may now be more capable than the one that entered the war.
Why the Russian Air Force Threat Looks Different Now
Airpower experts say the war has acted as a live laboratory for Russian pilots and planners. Justin Bronk, an airpower expert at the United Kingdom’s Royal United Services Institute, said in a recent report that Russian airpower “represents a greater threat to Western air power capabilities in Europe than it did prior to the invasion of Ukraine. ” That is a serious change in assessment, especially because early failures in Ukraine encouraged many observers to downgrade the threat.
Bronk argues that this would be a mistake. He said that, in many respects, the VKS of 2025 is a significantly more capable potential threat for Western air forces than it was in 2022. The warning is not that Russia has emerged unscathed. It is that it has adapted while fighting, and adaptation can matter as much as raw numbers in an air war.
Losses, Production, and the Hidden Balance Sheet
The public picture of attrition can be misleading. Bronk said around 130 Russian fixed-wing aircraft have been shot down or badly damaged in the fighting, based on interviews with Western air forces and ministries, data from Ukraine’s armed forces, and open-source information. Yet he also said that the aircraft types lost most heavily, including the Su-25SM and Su-34(M), are not especially useful to Russia in a conflict with NATO.
More important, Russia has continued producing aircraft. Bronk said Russia has been able to produce more of its Su-35S, Su-34s, and Su-30SM aircraft than have been lost in the war, while deliveries for other aircraft types have also continued. That means the overall fleet has not simply shrunk in a straight line. In some areas, losses have been absorbed by ongoing production, keeping the force from weakening in the way many expected.
The result is a more complicated balance sheet for the russian air force: visible losses on one side, but fleet regeneration and retained capabilities on the other.
Combat Experience Is Changing Pilot Quality
The most durable gain may be less visible than damaged airframes. Bronk said Russia’s aircrew cadre, including its pilots, has grown significantly more capable during the war. Russia has lost experienced crew members, but it has lost far fewer pilots than jets. That distinction matters because skilled pilots are harder to replace in any air force.
Bronk added that any losses in capable crews have been more than offset by additional flying time and combat experience in Ukraine. He also said Russian pilots generally flew far less than their NATO counterparts for a long time, which means the war has narrowed a longstanding gap in practical experience. In other words, even a force that has suffered losses can become more dangerous if it has learned faster than its adversaries expected.
NATO’s Reassessment and the Wider European Stakes
Retired U. S. Army Maj. Gen. Gordon “Skip” Davis, who served as NATO’s deputy assistant secretary-general for its defense-investment division, said NATO needs to ensure it has upgraded its view of Russia’s air force. “NATO can’t be complacent with what it thought Russia once was as an air power versus what it is now, ” he said. Davis added that Russia is more dangerous now to NATO than it was before the war because of lessons learned.
That warning carries regional weight. If NATO planners keep judging the russian air force through the lens of its early war failures alone, they risk underestimating a force that has changed under fire. The larger issue is not whether Russia has become invulnerable; it clearly has not. The issue is whether its remaining aircraft, crews, and experience now present a tougher challenge in Europe than prewar assumptions allow.
The lesson is not comfort but caution: if war can expose weakness, it can also generate capability. The question for NATO is whether its own planning has fully caught up with that reality.
